On Sunday, those same Thunder eliminated Memphis from the playoffs in a 4-0 first-round sweep.

The Thunder’s rapid ascent from doormats to dynasty is the main story in that transition, but the Grizzlies’ descent matters, too. Three years ago, it seemed they had the world at their fingertips, with a team en route to 56 wins, a telegenic young star in Ja Morant, plus secondary star talent in Jaren Jackson Jr. and Desmond Bane and arguably the league’s deepest bench behind it.

Memphis hasn’t exactly belly-flopped since — the Grizzlies won 48 games in the minefield of the Western Conference this season — but the franchise nonetheless finds itself at a crossroads. The past three seasons have produced just one playoff series win, despite twice making the field as the West’s second seed. This spring, a late-season collapse led to Taylor Jenkins’ firing as the Grizzlies went 14-23 over their final 37 games (including  the Play-In and playoffs).

So, what happened here?

In analyzing the Grizzlies, I wanted to dig deeper into a few questions: What caused their elevator to stall out before they reached the penthouse? Are there more general lessons behind it? And what does success look like from here? I have my own opinions, but I also talked to several executives and scouts about the Grizzlies, where they’ve been and what they can do now. Those people were granted anonymity so they could speak freely. What follows is a consensus of their takeaways.

Before I delve too deeply: Going from good to great is hard. It may seem inevitable that a young team that gets to 50 wins will inevitably hit 60 next, but that’s not how it works. The history of the NBA is littered with examples of precocious young cores that never quite got to the point of being a true title contender.

It’s also easy to imagine alternate scenarios where the narrative seems much less harsh. Morant was hurt in the 2022 and 2023 playoffs and again in Game 3 against Oklahoma City. A Grizzlies fan could credibly argue that if Morant doesn’t get low-bridged by Lu Dort before halftime in Game 3, the Grizzlies go back to Oklahoma City with the series tied.

In talking with several executives about where Memphis might have misstepped over the past three years, four main themes came up. And literally everyone alluded to multiple factors and a confluence of events that “almost snuck up on them,” as one put it.

However, one factor was far more prominent than the other three. Let’s go through them one by one, and the broader lessons.

Get the centerpiece right

By far, Morant was the biggest lightning rod for execs explaining why Memphis hadn’t taken another step forward. In their view, Morant’s lack of dependability — for health, for shooting, for defense, for leadership, for avoiding entirely avoidable suspensions — makes it impossible to build a team around him.

That said, few blamed the Grizzlies for riding with Morant this far. The alternative, at almost any point before his first suspension, would have been a Nico Harrison-type situation that would have been wildly unpopular.

Nonetheless, Morant has slipped. Once viewed as a potential All-NBA player, his lack of progress as a defender or — especially — as a shooter makes it hard to envision him hitting that level even if healthy. Morant’s thin frame also takes a pounding on his drives to the hoop, and he was injured on three collision plays this year: twice when he was undercut in mid-air and once on a crunching screen by Daniel Theis.

For those reasons, many execs think Morant’s trade value is limited despite his star power. He’s an electrifying player who can sell tickets and merchandise, and that could be a reason for a small-market team like Memphis to hang on to him (or for another to acquire him, perhaps). However, a trading partner will view those same dependability issues as a potential liability on a max deal that still has three years and nearly $127 million left.

Don’t overextend on supporting cast

I was a bit surprised how many people I talked to looked at Bane’s situation as a negative. He has four years and $163 million left on his current contract, but the execs I talked to said he wasn’t good enough to be an elite team’s third-best player and was overpaid for what he was.

This shade feels too harsh — Bane isn’t an All-Star, but he’s a 41-percent career 3-point shooter with an average 18.5 player efficiency rating over the last three seasons. He’s also, by all accounts, a relentless worker and a model citizen.

However, that perception of Bane’s deal in other front offices does matter for the Grizzlies’ optionality: Attempting to move Bane for assets or multiple young players might not generate much return.

(While we’re here: One thing everyone I talked to agreed on: Jackson as the “No. 2 guy” was worth every cent. Maybe they were humoring me because I was part of the front office that drafted him, but he’s also the team’s only All-NBA candidate.)

Hit the big swing trade

The Grizzlies have tried to take big swings in the trade market at various times in the last three years, including engaging the Phoenix Suns on Kevin Durant this year. However, the biggest one that actually got completed was dealing Tyus Jones and two first-rounders for Marcus Smart when he was just past his sell-by date in the summer of 2023.

It’s somewhat ironic given that the Grizzlies have nailed so many small moves in the same period. “The Smart trade killed them,” as one rival exec put it, costing them draft assets and a $20-million salary slot for a whole lot of not much. On a roster that couldn’t afford a miss once Jackson, Bane and Morant graduated to expensive veteran deals, Smart was nearly dead money. He was neither healthy nor happy in Memphis, and his level of play dropped off even when he was active; the Grizzlies ended up giving Washington another first just to move off the last year of his deal.

Finding cheap talent is hard

Kleiman criticized himself in his postseason media session for not picking up Jake LaRavia’s option as added depth, but the deepest wounds likely came before this season.

Memphis pursued contending with a Morant-Jackson-Bane core when the other two starters were Dillon Brooks and Steven Adams, and the bench was constantly extending leads with players like Jones, De’Anthony Melton, Kyle Anderson and Clarke.

However, only Clarke remains from that supporting cast. Bets on players like Smart, Ziaire Williams, Derrick Rose and David Roddy to replace them haven’t panned out. Even the ones who were OK (John Konchar, Luke Kennard, the still-developing Zach Edey) were a downgrade from their predecessors.

The reality is that they’ll almost certainly never have a bench as strong as that 2022 unit, when their three best players and Clarke were still on rookie deals so they could bring multiple $10-million players off the pine. Going forward, they’re likely to have three max or near-max players soaking up salary at the top of the food chain, which means they need to find more players like Pippen and Wells at the back end.